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"Good! Now we shall have news from hell before breakfast!"
-Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman,
upon learning that three Civil War
press correspondents had just been
killed by an exploding shell, circa
1863.1
In the handling of the press, the American practice was to provide
every facility that would permit an individual to go wherever he
wanted, whenever he wanted. While this imposed upon us some
additional administrative burdens, it paid off in big dividends be-
cause of the conviction in the minds of all that there was no at-
tempt to conceal error and stupidity.
-- Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower,
describing U.S. military relations
with the press during World War IV3
"Having reporters running around would overwhelm the
battlefield."
-Col. Bill Mulvey,
director of the Joint Information
Bureau, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia,
1991.
3
"[T]he strongest emotion yet discovered in the human creature is
neither love nor hate, but the naked desire to edit."
-Joseph L. Galloway,
reporter for U.S. News & World
Report, describing the censorship
procedures of Operation Desert
Storm.4
Introduction
Before the leaders of the U.S. military decided to drop the first
bombs on Iraq to begin the Persian Gulf War on January 16, 1991, the
Department of Defense had already laid down news restrictions to diffuse
the power of the media covering the hostilities in the Middle East.' On-
1. Frank B. Cross & Stephen M. Griffin, A Right of Press Access to United States Military
Operations, 21 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 989, 993 n.18 (1987) (quoting F. MOTT, AMERICAN
JOURNALISM: A HISTORY 1690-1940 337 (1962)).
2. Id. at 998 (quoting DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, CRUSADE IN EUROPE 300-01 (1948)).
3. Richard Zoglin, Volleys on the Information Front, TIME, Feb. 4, 1991, at 44, 45.
4. Joseph L. Galloway, Who's Afraid of the Truth?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 4,
1991, at 49.
5. The Department of Defense issued lists of "releasable" and "unreleasable" material,
along with procedures for "security reviews" and interviews, on January 7, 1991. These in-
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site censorship and limited access to battlefields through a "pooling" sys-
tem hampered the efforts of the press to keep up with Scud missiles in the
sky, oil slicks in the sea, and combat on the ground.6 Some reporters
complained that pool reporting not only slowed the flow of information
to the public, but also reduced the chances of getting either candid opin-
ions or negative views from soldiers, thereby keeping the public from
accurately assessing the war.' Because all reporters received the same
information, "scoops" were not possible, and the competitiveness of the
members of the news industry was largely quelled.' Above all, the media
restrictions threatened the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of
the press.9
Members of the media went to court to voice their objections over
the military's Guidelines for News Media and its Ground Rules.10 Sev-
eral writers and publications, including The Village Voice and The Na-
tion, filed suit on January 10, 1991. In Nation Magazine v. United States
Department of Defense, the plaintiffs alleged that the Pentagon's denial of
free battlefield access and the creation of media pools damaged their ex-
ercise of freedom of speech and freedom of the press and deprived them
of equal protection under the law." The plaintiffs also alleged that the
structions were revised with guidelines (procedures for press pool members) and ground rules
(updated lists of "unreleasable" material) three times in two weeks. See Nation Magazine v.
United States Dep't of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1575-78, 1580-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (apps.
A, B, C, and E).
All restrictions were lifted on March 4, 1991, on informal cessation of hostilities. Id at
1563.
6. The Department of Defense did not allow all interested correspondents to cover first-
hand the hostilities in the Persian Gulf. The military formed press pools composed of repre-
sentatives from media organizations, such as television networks and wire services, that met
criteria set forth in the Pentagon's guidelines. CENTCOM Pool Membership and Operating
Procedures (Jan. 30, 1991), reprinted in Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1578-79 (app. D.)
[hereinafter "App. D"]. Pool members traveled through Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait with
military escorts.
7. Zoglin, supra note 3, at 45.
8. Richard Zoglin, Jumping Out of the Pool, TIME, Feb. 18, 1991, at 39.
9. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press
." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
10. The military distributed Combat Correspondent Pool Media Ground Rules on Janu-
ary 3, 1991 [hereinafter CCP Ground Rules] [available on file at Hastings Constitutional Law
Quarterly]. Their progeny, the Guidelines for News Media, CENTCOM Pool Membership
and Operating Procedures, and Operation Desert Shield Ground Rules, appear in the appendi-
ces of Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1575-82 (apps. A-E).
11. First Amended Complaint at 21, 28-29, Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. 1558
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
In order to focus on broad First Amendment issues, this Article will not discuss the
claims regarding discriminatory application of the Desert Storm pooling procedures.
For the approach of Judge Leonard B. Sand, who presided over the Nation Magazine
case, see Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1573-75. Judge Sand found that the government,
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pools and "security reviews" of reports constituted a prior restraint and
that disparate treatment of reporters by the government (including paid
travel and expedited visas for pro-government correspondents) violated
the First and Fifth Amendments.
12
The court in the Nation Magazine case ruled that despite its "power
to hear the case on the merits"' 3 because the issues were not moot,
14
none of the plaintiffs' claims were eligible for the relief sought. The case
was dismissed on April 16, 1991.
The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, including the
following:
(1) A preliminary injunction "barring defendants, for any reason
other than bona fide security reasons, from hindering any member
of the press in coverage of deployment and overt combat by United
States forces and prohibiting defendants from excluding the press
from areas where United States forces are deployed or engaged in
combat;"
by establishing media pools to cover the war, rendered the Persian Gulf theater a "limited
public forum," and the government therefore had to provide access to that forum in a nondis-
criminatory manner. Id. at 1573 (citations omitted). Access may be limited, however, by
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. Id. at 1574 (citations omitted). Judge Sand
did not determine whether the pooling procedures were applied discriminatorily because the
plaintiffs' prayer for relief lacked specificity. Id. at 1575. The plaintiffs stood by their demand
for a declaration that the press should have unlimited unilateral access to combat areas. Id.
Judge Sand had pressed the plaintiffs to propose specific remedial measures, "such as sug-
gesting that any regulations must include provisions for a speedy administrative review process
for those who claim they were improperly excluded form a pool .... Id.
12. First Amended Complaint at 28-29, Nation Magazine, 762 F.Supp. 1558 (S.D.N.Y.
1991).
13. Id. at 1569.
14. "(A] case becomes moot when the issues 'presented are no longer live or the parties
lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.' "Id. at 1568 (quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 455
U.S. 478, 481 (1982)). Even if an issue is no longer "live," it is not moot if it is "capable of
repetition, yet evading review." Id. (quoting Southern Pac. Terminal v. Interstate Commerce
Comm'n, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)).
Two elements must exist for the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" doctrine to
apply:
(1) "the challenged action must have been too short in duration to be fully litigated
prior to its cessation or expiration," id.; and
(2) "there must be a 'reasonable expectation' that the party bringing the action
would be 'subjected to the same action again."'
Id. (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975)).
Applying the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" test to The Nation's complaint,
the court did not find the case moot because (1) the Persian Gulf War ended too quickly for
the judicial process to resolve the dispute over the media restrictions, and (2) "it is not unrea-
sonable to suppose that in future military activities, [the Department of Defense] will behave in
a manner that is susceptible to the same challenges as those raised in this complaint," and that
The Nation, with a "long history of covering wartime stories, will be seeking to report the news
during the next conflict." Id. at 1569.
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(2) A permanent injunction "ordering defendants to provide the
press access where U.S. forces are deployed or engaged in overt
operations;"
(3) A permanent injunction "enjoining defendants from prevent-
ing, hindering, obstructing, delaying or exercising a prior restraint
on conduct constituting freedom of the press by plaintiffs and other
members of the U.S. press;"
(4) A declaration "that the defendants' policy, pattern and prac-
tice limiting, preventing, hindering, obstructing and delaying news-
gathering and freedom of the press violate the constitutional rights
of plaintiffs and the United States press"; and
(5) A declaration that "defendants' creation and promotion of a
pool of journalists is unconstitutional."' 5
The judge ruled that the plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief were
moot. 16 Because the Pentagon had lifted its media restrictions by the
time The Nation's case was heard and the press was no longer con-
strained from traveling throughout the area of the war, "there [was] no
longer any presently operative practice for [the c]ourt to enjoin."17 The
court also ruled that the past injuries suffered by the press were inappro-
priate bases for injunctive relief."8 Under the Supreme Court's standard,
injunctive relief is available when there is a danger of irreparable harm.19
In Nation Magazine, there was no threat of irreparable harm as the plain-
tiffs were then "able to gather and report news freely."20
The court declined to rule on the two requests for declaratory relief
because they were grounded in unclear issues. These claims for declara-
tory relief, based on the Department of Defense's use of media pools,
were not moot because they were broad and "capable of repetition."21
The court found instead that the case did not present the First and Fifth
Amendment issues in a "clean-cut and concrete form."
22
This "clean-cut" standard is derived from Rescue Army v. Municipal
Court,23 in which the United States Supreme Court considered the con-
stitutionality of city ordinances governing the solicitation of charitable
contributions in Los Angeles. The ordinances prohibited solicitation in
specified public places "by means of any box or receptacle" except "by
the express written permission of the Board [of Social Service Commis-
15. First Amended Verified Complaint at 30-31, Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. 1558
(No. 91 Civ. 0238 (LBS)).
16. Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1570.
17. Id
18. Id.
19. Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 88 (1974).
20. Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1570.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1571 (quoting Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 584 (1947)).
23. 331 U.S. 549 (1947).
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sioners]" and only if the solicitor first filed a notice of intention with the
Department of Social Service. 4 In addition, any person soliciting contri-
butions had to exhibit an information card for potential contributors to
see.
25
The complex procedural history of Rescue Army in the California
state courts kept the United States Supreme Court from ruling on the
alleged constitutional shortcomings of the ordinances. The Rescue
Army was a religious group that solicited donations for charity as part of
its religion.26 One of the Rescue Army's officers was arrested and
charged with violating the Los Angeles ordinances that regulated solicit-
ing.27 He had been convicted twice under those ordinances, but both
convictions had been reversed.28 Rescue Army challenged the constitu-
tionality of the ordinances under the First and Fourteenth Amendments
and alleged that the ordinances imposed a prior restraint on, and unduly
abridged its rights to, the free exercise of religion.29
The United States Supreme Court refused to consider the constitu-
tional questions for three reasons. First,
the constitutional issues [were presented] in highly abstract
form.... The record presents only bare allegations that [the Res-
cue Army officer] was charged criminally with violating [the ordi-
nances], and that those sections are unconstitutional, on various
assignments, as applied to his alleged solicitations. We are there-
fore without benefit of the precision which would be afforded by
proof of conduct made upon trial.30
Second, the Court was unclear whether the officer was charged with two
or three distinct offenses3 and was therefore precluded from ruling on
the constitutionality of the regulation to be used to secure his convic-
tion.32 Third, the Court found the California Supreme Court's construc-
tion of the local licensing requirements to be ambiguous.33 Together,
these factors created so many uncertainties that the Court declined to
exercise jurisdiction.34
The Nation Magazine court declined to exercise its jurisdiction to
declare the Desert Storm access restrictions unconstitutional because,
24. Id. at 553-54 (quoting Los ANGELES, CA. MUN. CODE §§ 44.09(a) and (b)).
25. Id. at 554 (quoting Los ANGELES, CA. MUN. CODE § 44.12).
26. Id. at 550.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 552.
29. Id. at 550.
30. Id. at 575.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 577.
33. Id. at 581.
34. Id. at 584.
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just as the constitutional challenge against the city ordinances in Rescue
Army had been "highly abstract,"35 the claimed right of access to mili-
tary operations has been an unsettled right compared to press access to
such places as prisons, parks, and courtrooms.36 Finding a First Amend-
ment right "to gather and report news that involves United States mili-
tary operations" and a right "to observe events as they occur" would
have required the court to "chart[] new constitutional territory."37 The
court wrote:
In order to decide this case on the merits, it would be necessary to
define the outer constitutional boundaries of access. Pursuant to
long-settled policy in the disposition of constitutional questions,
courts should refrain from deciding issues presented in a highly
abstract form, especially in instances where the Supreme Court has
not articulated guiding standards. See Rescue Army, 331 U.S. at
575-85. Since the principles at stake are important and require a
delicate balancing, prudence dictates that we leave the definition of
the exact parameters of press access to military operations abroad
for a later date when a full record is available, in the unfortunate
event that there is another military operation.38
Had the Nation Magazine court adjudicated the case, it would have
found ample evidence to rule that the Department of Defense had vio-
lated the First Amendment. Two types of obstacles impeded the freedom
of the press: prior restraints and denial of access. The court would have
had to invoke strict scrutiny to evaluate the Pentagon's treatment of the
press, thereby placing a heavy burden on the government to justify its
restrictive actions.39 To evaluate such justifications in the past, the
Supreme Court has weighed the interests of national security against the
historical rights of the press.4
35. Id at 575.
36. Nation Magazine v. United States Dep't of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1572
(S.D.N.Y. 1991); see Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 830-31 (1974) (stating that the press has
no general access to state prisons); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974)
(holding that the press has no general access to federal prisons); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496,
515 (1939) (affirming that the public has general access to parks); Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 577 (1980) (stating that the press has access to criminal trials).
37. Nation Magazine v. United States Dep't of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1571
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
38. Id at 1572.
39. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam)
(stating that system of prior restraints "comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption
against its constitutional validity") (quoting Bantam Book v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963));
Globe Newspapers Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1982) (denying that the right
of access must be "necessitated by a compelling governmental interest").
40. See, eg., Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 577 (1980) (holding that
the First Amendment assures access of press to places traditionally open to public); Near v.
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I. Censorship in War
A. From the Civil War to Grenada
Under conditions of war, the United States government has often
sought to censor news reports in the name of national security and to
make restrictions tighter as the sources of communication have crept
closer to battle zones. During the first year of the Civil War, the Union
Army and members of the press agreed on a set of voluntary censorship
guidelines. The Northern military asked newspaper editors to refrain
from publishing "any matter that may furnish aid and comfort to the
enemy."41 In contrast, the Confederate government stringently censored
Southern newspapers.42 During World War I, President Woodrow Wil-
son's Committee on Public Information asked that newspapers volunta-
rily not print advance reports about troop strengths, troop and ship
movements, anti-aircraft defenses, and harbor defenses.4" At the front,
where reporters sometimes lived permanently with the soldiers, 4" news-
paper writers were required to secure the prior approval of government
censors before transmitting their copy by cable or delivering it through
the mail.45
Similar domestic and front-line constraints hindered reporters dur-
ing World War II, although they had substantial access to combat areas.
The U.S. Office of Censorship's Code of Wartime Practices, effective Jan-
uary 15, 1942,46 requested that newspapers not publish sensitive informa-
tion about troop, plane, and ship movements, fortifications, weather
conditions, casualty lists, damage by enemy attack, transportation of war
materials, and movements of U.S. officials abroad.47 Correspondents in
the field had to agree to submit all their copy to military censors in order
to be accredited.48 Once accredited, however, reporters roamed freely.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (stating that prior restraints may be imposed in interests
of national security).
41. Howard B. Homonoff, Note, The First Amendment and National Security: The Con-
stitutionality of Press Censorship and Access Denial in Military Operations, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 369, 372-73 (1985) (quoting FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM HAMILTON TO THE
WARREN COURT 228 (H. Nelson ed., 1967)).
The government also suspended the operations of newspapers it considered to be under-
mining the war effort, and it forbade publications containing supposedly "disloyal content"
from using the mails. Id. at 373.
42. Jack A. Gottschalk, "Consistent with Security"... A History of American Military
Press Censorship, COMM. & L., Summer 1983, at 35, 36.
43. Homonoff, supra note 41, at 373-74.
44. Id. at 381.
45. Id. at 376.
46. Gottschalk, supra note 42, at 40.
47. Homonoff, supra note 41, at 377; see also Cross & Griffin, supra note 1, at 999 n.66.
48. Cross & Griffin, supra note 1, at 999.
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Correspondents accompanied the troops invading North Africa and Sic-
ily, witnessed the Battle of Iwo Jima from ships and planes and on the
ground, and landed with the invasion forces at Normandy on D-Day.4 9
After the Korean War, censorship restrictions eased on war corre-
spondents until the invasion of Grenada in 1983. As the war in Korea
escalated, reporters at the front had to submit all proposed stories to
censors at Army headquarters.50 In Vietnam, however, correspondents
received credentials from U.S. military authorities in exchange for a
signed pledge to adhere to security guidelines.51 Reporters agreed not to
release such information as future plans, operations, or strikes; unit
designations and troop movements during an operation; the exact
number and types of casualties or damage suffered by friendly units; or
aerial photos of fixed installations. 2 Over 2000 members of the news
media reported from Vietnam,53 and they enjoyed nearly unrestricted
mobility. Access to observe battles was granted at the discretion of field
commanders, who rarely denied access.54 During the war, only six cor-
respondents violated security regulations seriously enough to lose their
accreditation.55
Despite the media's record of respect for national security during
wartime, the Reagan Adninistration excluded representatives of the me-
dia from Grenada for the first two days of the invasion of that island on
October 25 and 26, 1983.6 The United States invasion aimed to secure
the safety of Americans in Grenada and to help restore "law and order
and responsive governmental institutions" to the islandY.5  Military offi-
cials imposed a media blackout by refusing to transport the press to Gre-
nada, by turning away chartered press boats, and by removing any
49. Id. at 997 n.55, 998.
50. Homonoff, supra note 41 at 379. Accounts of the Korean conflict are inconsistent
about the degree of enforcement of the censorship procedures. See Matthew J. Jacobs, Note,
Assessing the Constitutionality of Press Restrictions in the Persian Gulf War, 44 STAN. L. REv.
675, 683 (1992).
51. Roger W. Pincus, Comment, Press Access to Military Operations: Grenada and the
Need for a New Analytical Framework, 135 U. PA. L. Rv. 813, 838 n.162 (1987).
52. Excerpts from Rules Governing Public Release of Military Information, Reports Com-
mittee for Freedom of the Press, §§ 1, 4, 6, 15 (Oct. 31, 1966 and Mar. 29, 1967) (copy on file
with the author).
53. Gottschalk, supra note 42, at 49.
54. Homonoff, supra note 41, at 379; Nation Magazine v. United States Dep't of Defense,
762 F. Supp. 1558, 1563 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
55. Homonoff, supra note 41, at 379.
56. Pincus, supra note 51, at 813. The decision to exclude the press reportedly was made
by the invasion task force commander with the Secretary of Defense and the White House
declining to overrule him. Id. at 841-42.
57. Id. at 843 n.181.
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reporters who had reached the island.5" These measures were designed
to achieve military surprise, to permit the invasion force to concentrate
on military objectives without the supposed distraction or physical ob-
struction caused by the press, to avoid allocating troops to protecting
reporters, and to avoid the difficulty of selecting media pools to accom-
pany the troops from the 1800 reporters accredited by the White
House.59 When most of the operation was completed by the third day,
the military transported seven correspondents to the island.' By No-
vember 7, almost two weeks after the invasion began, all travel restric-
tions were lifted.6" On October 28, 1983, publisher Larry Flynt and
others filed suit against the government for prohibiting press coverage of
the initial stages of the invasion.62
Unlike the relief sought by The Nation, which called for a broad
application of the First and Fifth Amendments beyond the immediate
circumstances of Desert Storm, the relief sought in Flynt was limited to
the U.S. government's actions toward the press on Grenada. Flynt
wanted an injunction prohibiting Secretary of Defense Caspar Wein-
berger and other government officials from "'preventing or otherwise
hindering Plaintiffs from sending reporters to the sovereign nation of
Grenada to gather news .... , "63 Flynt also sought a declaration that
"'the course of conduct engaged in by Defendants, . . .in preventing
Plaintiffs, or otherwise hindering Plaintiffs', efforts to send reporters to
the sovereign nation of Grenada for the purpose of gathering news is in
violation of the Constitution [sic] laws, and treaties of the United
States. .... [sic]''64
The requests for both injunctive and declaratory relief were found
moot.65 Because all travel restrictions to Grenada were rescinded on No-
vember 7, 1983, and the military action on the island ended by December
15, 1983, the court found the request for injunctive relief "clearly
58. Id. at 813 n.3.
59. Id. at 813; Cross & Griffin, supra note 1, at 1005. The U.S. government traditionally
formed press pools by determining what categories of news media (e.g., television) should be
represented and having the reporters themselves choose representatives from each category.
Flynt v. Weinberger, 588 F. Supp. 57, 58 n.1 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd but vacated on other
grounds, 762 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam).
60. The seven correspondents permitted to enter Grenada on October 27, 1983, were cho-
sen according to the traditional pooling method. The U.S. government decided the categories
of news media that would be allowed on the island and the press corps selected representatives
from each category. Flynt, 588 F. Supp. at 58 n.l.
61. Id. at 58.
62. Id
63. Id. (quoting Plaintiffs complaint).
64. Id.
65. Flynt v. Weinberger, 762 F.2d 134, 135 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam).
moot."66 The request for declaratory relief was determined to be moot
because the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment "solely with respect
to the constitutionality of the press ban in Grenada," making the issues
raised in the complaint "no longer 'live.' "67 The case was not "capable
of repetition, yet evading review" because there was "no 'reasonable ex-
pectation' that the Grenada controversy would recur."6
Having escaped legal challenge for its treatment of the press on Gre-
nada, the military developed the concept of pooling the media to cover
future military operations. The Sidle Report, written by the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Media-Military Relations Panel in August 1984,
made several recommendations in the wake of the Grenada invasion.
These suggestions included planning media coverage of military actions
concurrently with planning the action itself, providing for a press pool
when circumstances warrant, developing an accreditation system for cor-
respondents, and encouraging voluntary compliance by the media with
security guidelines similar to those guidelines used in Vietnam.69 The
66. Id.
67. Id. (quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982)).
68. Id. (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975)). The trial court noted,
"The invasion of Grenada was, like any invasion or military intervention, a unique event. Its
occurrence required a combination of geopolitical circumstances not likely to be repeated."
Flynt v. Weinberger, 588 F. Supp. 57, 59 (D.D.C. 1984).
This reasoning, however, has been attacked as flying in the face of First Amendment
precedent:
[The Flynt decisions are] clearly at odds with established First Amendment jurispru-
dence. The district court judge gave the field commander total authority to curb or
even ban the press. The court set no standard by which the government would have
to justify its decision, and even suggested the government need not justify its decision
at all. Clearly, the government should have been forced to present its justifications to
the court, even if the regulations were valid.
Jacobs, supra note 50, at 716 (citations omitted).
Although the plaintiffs' complaint is mostly to blame for the Flynt court's narrow focus,
the Nation Magazine court expressed a general judicial reluctance to find that all wars are alike
and that particular wartime restrictions on the press will recur. The Nation Magazine court
asked,
Who today can even predict the manner in which the next war may be fought?... If
there is a certain lesson that Desert Storm has taught us, it is that the nature of
warfare has changed radically as a result of new technology. There is little similarity
between the Vietnam War and Desert Storm. The traditional battlefield of the two
World Wars and of Vietnam may be a phenomenon of the past.
Nation Magazine v. United States Dep't of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1574-75 n.16
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
Some critics may argue that this reasoning is a shield of insincerity held by the courts to
deflect constitutional attacks from government policy. Charges of insincerity aside, future
press-access plaintiffs must prepare to penetrate the "no two wars are alike" shield, using
broad First Amendment complaints sufficiently sharpened to slice through the Rescue Army
argument. See id. at 1575.
69. Troops To Take Media Into Battle, NEWS MEDIA & L., Nov./Dec. 1984, at 43-44.
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military put some of these ideas into play within the next few years. Af-
ter forming its first press pool in October 1984,70 the Pentagon allowed
only pool-assigned reporters to cover the U.S.-Honduras military exer-
cises in April 1985,71 the hostilities with Libya in March 1986,72 the U.S.
Navy Convoy operations in the Persian Gulf in July 1987, 73 and the inva-
sion of Panama in December 1989.74
B. "Storms" and "Pools" in the Desert
Pools may have been familiar, therefore, to the 70071 to 110076 jour-
nalists reporting from the Gulf, although the selection process they faced
was new. The military granted pool membership mostly to media orga-
nizations rather than to individuals77 with the result that fewer than one
in seven applicants received admission to a pool.78 Most organizations
had to meet two initial criteria: they must have belonged to "media that
principally serve[d] the American public and that [had] a long-term pres-
ence covering Department of Defense military operations."79 The mili-
tary divided pool positions into nine categories of media: television,
radio, wire service, news magazine, newspaper, pencil, photo, Saudi, and
international.80 An organization could participate in pool activities "af-
70. Jacobs, supra note 50, at 685.
71. Cross & Griffin, supra note 1, at 1047.
72. Philip Shenon, Reporters' Pool Kept from Action, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1986, § 1, at 7.
73. Cross & Griffin, supra note 1, at 1047 n.364.
74. Ia. at 1048.
A Defense Department spokesman has acknowledged, however, that in Panama, pools
arrived too late and got too little coverage of the battle. Elaine Sciolino, Voice of the Pentagon
Delivers Press Curbs with a Deftness Honed on TV, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1991, at A9. Criticism
of the military's treatment of the press during the Panama invasion helped create another
panel, this one chaired by Fred S. Hoffman, a Pentagon spokesman under President Reagan.
Hoffman's committee concluded that the press should receiv6 more freedom to cover military
operations. Jacobs, supra, note 50, at 685.
75. Zoglin, supra note 3, at 45.
76. Sciolino, supra note 74.
77. App. D., supra note 6, at 1578. Specific individuals received membership in the "pen-
cil" category, that is, print reporters who did not write for a newspaper, wire service, or news
magazine. Id.
The military based media pool membership on affiliation with an organization "[b]ecause
of the extensive media presence in the Arabian Gulf, the fact that some media organizations
are represented by many individuals, and the likelihood that more organizations and individu-
als will arrive in the future [after Jan. 30, 1991, when these procedures went into effect]." Id
78. Malcolm W. Browne, The Military vs. The Press, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1991, § 6
(Magazine), at 26, 28.
79. App. D., supra note 6, at 1578.
Media organizations that did not principally serve the American public qualified to par-
ticipate in the international media pool. Id.
80. Id. The number of media categories expanded to accommodate the growing number
of correspondents arriving in the Persian Gulf to cover the hostilities. During Desert Shield,
ter being a member of the appropriate media pool category for three con-
tinuous weeks," which apparently meant it had stayed in Saudi Arabia
for at least three consecutive weeks."'
The composition and size of the pools changed as the war
progressed. Membership in the pools was supposed to rotate every two
or three weeks.8 2 At the start of the war, eleven pools covered actual
combat, with a total of ninety-nine reporters, photographers, and camera
operators assigned to the field.8 3 As the war advanced, the military al-
lowed more journalists onto the battlefields and expanded the types of
pools. Eighteen-member pools reported on ground combat and seven-
member pools focused on ground combat and other coverage.8 4 About
200 reporters accompanied the troops during the invasion of Kuwait. 5
Eligibility for pool membership was essential to obtaining the latest-
breaking information about action in the Gulf for two reasons. First, any
pool member's work, including written reports, photographs, and video-
tape, became the property of all pool participants and media organiza-
tions eligible to join the pools.86 Correspondents shared their work
among all of the representatives of their own medium. For example, all
television pool members shared video footage.87 "In effect," one reporter
wrote, "each pool member [became] an unpaid employee of the Depart-
ment of Defense, on whose behalf he or she prepare[d] the news of the
war for the outer world."88  Non-pool media representatives inhabited
this "outer world," for they did not receive pool reports.89 In addition,
non-pool reporters risked violating camp security if they ventured onto
the field. The Pentagon warned non-pool reporters:
News media personnel who are not members of the official...
media pools will not be permitted into forward areas. Reporters
there were only four media-specific pools: television, radio, print, and photo. CCP Ground
Rules, supra note 10, at 2, § I.G. (Jan. 3, 1991).
81. App. D., supra note 6, at 1578. Jacobs, supra note 50, at 691 n.100. Journalists from
outside the United States who wanted to cover the U.S.-led military efforts had to follow the
U.S. military's press restrictions. It is doubtful that the First Amendment protected foreign
reporters from these restrictions, especially in light of United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494
U.S. 259 (1990), which denied Fourth Amendment protection to citizens of other countries
from unconstitutional searches and seizures. Jacobs, supra note 50, at 691 n.100.
82. App. D., supra note 6, at 1579.
83. Galloway, supra note 4.
84. App. D., supra note 6, at 1578.
85. Richard Zoglin, It Was a Public Relations Rout Too, TIME, Mar. 11, 1991, at 56, 57.
86. App. D., supra note 6, at 1579.
87. Id.
88. Browne, supra note 78, at 29. See infra part III.B.3 for discussion of possible takings
issues (text accompanying notes 258-73).
89. Nation Magazine v. United States Dep't of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1564
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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are strongly discouraged from attempting to link up on their own
with combat units. U.S. commanders will maintain extremely
tight security throughout the operational area and will exclude
from the area of operation all unauthorized individuals.'
Although pool members were welcome in combat areas, they could
not travel freely. They had to remain with a military escort at all times
and follow the escort's instructions. Such instructions were "not in-
tended to hinder ... reporting. They [were] intended to facilitate troop
movement, ensure safety, and protect operational security."9 1 The pool
arrangement also restricted reporters largely to specified trips arranged
by military officials.9 2 Correspondents were not allowed to live with mili-
tary units, but rather had to rotate in and out of camps with military
escorts.9 3 There were no formal penalties for violating the rules, but U.S.
military officials reported some offenders to the Saudi Arabian govern-
ment, which temporarily revoked their press credentials.9 4
The military sometimes prevented pools from covering events as
they unfolded, raising the same kind of access complaints heard in Gre-
nada. For example, pool reporters were not allowed into the town of
Khafji until eighteen hours after the fighting there had begun.95 The best
information on that battle came from two French TV crews and a British
news team who entered Khaji well before American pool camera
crews. 96 A British crew also captured some of the first pictures of the
Iraqi-caused oil slick in the Persian Gulf two days before U.S. pool cam-
eras arrived at the scene. 97
When pool reporters did have timely access to events, a public af-
fairs officer of the Department of Defense at the scene subjected the sto-
ries to a security review "to determine if they contain[ed] sensitive
information about military plans, capabilities, operations, or vulnerabili-
ties ... that would jeopardize the outcome of an operation or the safety
of U.S. or coalition forces."9 " Information that was "not releasable" in-
cluded pinpoint datelines ("[n]o specific locations will be used when filing
... stories"); specific numbers of troops and aircraft; news about future
operations; photography that revealed the name or specific location of
90. Guidelines for News Media (Jan. 14, 1991), reprinted in Nation Magazine, 762 F.
Supp. at 1577 (app. C.) [hereinafter "App. C."].
91. CCP Ground Rules, supra note 10, at 1, § 1.B.
92. Zoglin, supra note 3, at 44.
93. Sciolino, supra note 74.




98. App. C, supra note 90, at 1577.
military forces or showed the level of security at military installations or
encampments; reports on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of enemy
"camouflage, cover, deception, targeting, direct and indirect fire, intelli-
gence collection, or security measures"; and "[d]uring an operation, spe-
cific information on friendly- force troop movements, tactical
deployments, and dispositions that would jeopardize operational security
or lives."9 9 If disagreements arose between correspondents and public
affairs officers about material to be censored, the director of the Joint
Information Bureau in Dhahran and the media representative would re-
view the material in question."w Unresolved issues would go to the Of-
fice of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs for review
with the appropriate bureau chief, with the originating reporter's news
organization making the ultimate decision on publication.101
The extensive web of censorship procedures sometimes snared infor-
mation that it ostensibly was not designed to catch. The Guidelines for
News Media stated, "Material will be examined solely for its conform-
ance to the.., ground rules, not for its potential to express criticism or
cause embarrassment."' 2 Nevertheless, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Public Affairs Louis A. (Pete) Williams told the Senate Governmen-
tal Affairs Committee that some reporters had been denied interviews
because military officials regarded the reporters' coverage as "unfavora-
ble."'0 3 A reporter for The Detroit Free Press, who wanted to describe
pilots as "giddy" after returning from early bombing missions, saw secur-
ity officers change the description to "proud"; they compromised on
"pumped up."'" Some information the military tried to keep to itself.
For instance, a military spokesman refused to acknowledge the capture
of some American pilots even after they appeared on Iraqi television.'0 5
When Defense Department officials permitted the release of a re-
port, sometimes approval came too late, either rendering the story un-
newsworthy or allowing others to pick up the news. Some reports for the
Wall Street Journal withstood delays up to sixty hours.106 After a New
York Times reporter complied with a request not to report that Ameri-
99. Operation Desert Shield Ground Rules (Jan. 14, 1991), reprinted in Nation Magazine,
762 F. Supp. at 1581-82 (app. E) [hereinafter "App. E"].
100. App. C, supra note 90, at 1577-78.
101. Id. at 1578.
102. Id. at 1577.
103. Richard L. Berke, Pentagon Defends Coverage Rules, While Admitting to Some De-
lays, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 21, 1991, at A14.
104. Jonathan Alter, Showdown at "Fact Gap," NEWSWEEK, Feb. 4, 1991, at 61.
105. Id.
106. Howard Kurtz, Pentagon Aims to "Discourage" Restrictions on Media, WASHINGTON
POST, Feb. 21, 1991, at A28.
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can pilots believed they had destroyed Iraq's nuclear weapons facilities,
first Agence France-Presse and then General Schwartzkopf released the
information over the next two days.1
0 7
On the domestic front, the military banned the media and the rest of
the public from observing soldiers' coffins arriving from the Gulf at Do-
ver Air Force Base in Delaware. When the buildup of troops in the Per-
sian Gulf began in the fall of 1990 and Dover served as a supply depot,
members of the press regularly reported from the base under escort by a
public affairs officer.' 08 Arguing that this past practice made Dover a
limited public forum for press access with an escort, °9 the press sought
access to the runways where the airplanes bearing the bodies arrived and
to the hangars where the Air Force stored the caskets."' 0
The Defense Department argued that Dover was a nonpublic forum
so that government regulation of speech on the base need only be reason-
able and viewpoint-neutral."' The military said that its regulations did
not suppress a particular point of view because "[e]veryone ha[d] been
excluded from the base.""' 2  Such a policy was reasonable because it
prevented a diversion from the base's mission as a primary departure
point for supplies to the Persian Gulf."3 In addition, the military argued
that holding public honor ceremonies for returning casualties would
107. Browne, supra note 78, at 45.
108. J.B. Pictures, Inc. v. Department of Defense, No. 91-397, at 3 (D.D.C. Mar. 8, 1991).
109. Id. at 7. When ruling on limitations to free speech on public property, courts apply a
three-tiered analysis to determine the standard under which it must evaluate those limitations.
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983); United States v.
Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990).
(1) Public sites traditionally used for assembly and communication, such as parks and
streets, are obviously public property. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. To restrict speech based on
content in such a forum, the government must prove its regulation is necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. Id. The government may
regulate the time, place, and manner of expression in traditional public fora if the regulations
are content neutral, narrowly tailored to serve significant governmental interests, and leave
open ample alternative channels of communication. Id
(2) The second category of public property is a site opened by the State "for use by the
public as a place for expressive activity," such as university meeting facilities, school board
meetings, and municipal theaters. Id. at 45. Courts will evaluate regulations on speech in such
a forum as if it were a traditional public forum. Id. at 46.
(3) The third classification of public property is a site "not by tradition or designation a
forum for public communication," which requires different First Amendment standards. Id.
at 46. In addition to time, place, and manner restrictions, the government may "reserve the
forum for its intended purposes ... as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an
effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view." Id.
110. J.B. Pictures, No. 91-397, at 4.
111. Id. at 13; see Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
112. JB. Pictures, No. 91-397, at 17.
113. Id at 15.
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compel "families of servicemen... to travel to Dover.... The military
had good reasons for not wanting to put that burden on families that
were already suffering and grieving." '114 The plaintiffs claimed that the
purpose behind the exclusion of the public was to prevent news coverage
of the soldiers killed in the war.'
15
The press lost its argument for a preliminary injunction against the
restrictions at Dover. The United States District Court for the District
of Columbia held that the press did not show a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits that its exclusion from covering the arrival of mili-
tary casualties violated the First Amendment.116 The court ruled that
Dover Air Force Base is not a public forum, that the regulations were
viewpoint-neutral, and that the regulations were reasonable.1 17 Agreeing
with the government, the court said that allowing public access to the
base "would detract from the security function at Dover... because of
the emotional situation that is created by the presence of bodies .... "1 18
Like the regulations at Dover, the battlefield restrictions on the
press also took into account the emotions of the families of fallen
soldiers, although the justifications for the restrictions changed as Desert
Shield became Desert Storm. One of the first sets of media ground rules
during Desert Shield was "designed to (1) protect the security and the
safety of service members, (2) protect next of kin sensitivities with regard
to wounded and killed service members, and (3) allow CCP [combat cor-
respondent pool] members the greatest permissible freedom and access in
covering operations."' 19 During Desert Storm, the purpose behind the
pools was "to get media representatives to and from the scene of military
action, to get their reports back to the Joint Information Bureau-
Dhahran for filing-rapidly and safely, and to permit unilateral media
coverage of combat and combat-related activity as soon as possible."1 0
The Department of Defense formed the media pools to
balance the media's desire for unilateral coverage with the logistics
realities of the military operation, which make it impossible for.
every media representative to cover every activity of his or her
114. Id. at 16.
115. It at 8.
116. Id at 24-25. Ruling on the other requirement for a preliminary injunction, the court
found that the plaintiffs would not be irreparably injured without the injunction. Id at 28.
117. Id. at 27.
118. Id. at 27-28.
119. CCP Ground Rules, supra note 10, at 1, preamble.
120. App. D, supra note 6, at 1578.
"Unilateral coverage" is the Department of Defense's antonym for "pool coverage." Na-
tion Magazine v. United States Dep't of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1564 n.6 (S.D.N.Y.
1991).
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choice, and with [the military's] responsibility to maintain opera-
tional security, protect the safety of the troops, and prevent inter-
ference with military operations. 2'
According to Pete Williams, the chief spokesman for the Department of
Defense, "The goal of the system isn't to deprive anyone of news.... It's
simply to discourage information that would jeopardize military opera-
tions and endanger human lives-pure and simple."' 2 2
One author has generalized into three categories the government's
interests in the security reviews and pooling procedures. The categories
are:
(1) logistics, including protecting reporters and "preparing a via-
ble battle plan";
(2) surprise, requiring safeguarding information from the enemy;
and
(3) the morale of troops and the public.123
The author formed these generalizations because "neither legislative his-
tory nor major statements by members of the executive branch offer an
explanation for these rules [for prepublication reviews and access restric-
tions]."' 2 4 On the contrary, the government's official reasons for impos-
ing restraints on the media appear in the many versions of the guidelines
and ground rules handed to reporters.1 25 The unofficial explanation-the
goal of discouraging information-came from the Pentagon's own
spokesperson. 126
II. The Constitution and the Press
A. Censorship and National Security
Given the Department of Defense's rationale, may the government
curtail freedom of the press in the name of national security, specifically
to protect the lives of troops fighting a war? The U.S. Supreme Court
first offered an affirmative opinion, albeit dictum, regarding censorship
provisions, in the 1931 case Near v. Minnesota. 27 In that case, the Court
struck down a Minnesota statute stating that any person "engaged in the
business of regularly ...producing, publishing or circulating ... an
obscene, lewd and lascivious newspaper, magazine or other periodical, or
a malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or
121. App. D, supra note 6, at 1578.
122. Sciolino, supra note 74.
123. Jacobs, supra note 50, at 693-94.
124. Jacobs, supra note 50, at 693 n.112.
125. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
127. 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
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other periodical, is guilty of a nuisance, and ... may be enjoined." '128
Holding that the statute suppressed the offending publication rather than
merely punishing the publisher, 29 and that it also put the publisher
under an "effective censorship,"13 the Court found the statute "to be an
infringement of the liberty of the press guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment." '131 Such liberty is not, however, unqualified. "The protec-
tion... as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited," the Near
Court wrote. 32 Among the Court's four exceptions to freedom from
prior restraints was the protection of national security:
"When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of
peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not
be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard
them as protected by any constitutional right." Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). No one would question but that a
government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting ser-
vice or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the
number and location of troops.
133
Forty years later, the Supreme Court directly confronted the issue of
First Amendment restrictions in a military situation in the "Pentagon
Papers" case, New York Times Co. v. United States. 134 While the war in
Vietnam dragged on, the federal government requested that the Court
enjoin The New York Times and The Washington Post from continuing to
publish the contents of a classified Defense Department study entitled
"History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy." '135 The
government argued that publication of further installments would pres-
ent a "grave and immediate danger" to U.S. security. 136 In a per curiam
decision, the Court held that " '[a]ny system of prior restraints of expres-
sion ...bear[s] a heavy presumption against its constitutional valid-
ity.' "137 The government had "'a heavy burden of showing justification
for the imposition of such a restraint,' ,138 and the Court ruled that the
128. Id. at 702 (quoting MINN. STAT. §§ 10123-1 to 10123-3 (Mason's 1927)).
129. Id at 711.
130. Id. at 712.
131. Id at 723.
132. Id. at 716.
133. Id The other three exceptions were obscenity, "incitements to acts of violence and
the overthrow by force of orderly government," id., and the utterance of words "'that may
have all the effect of force.'" Id. (quoting Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range, 221 U.S. 418,
439 (1911)).
134. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
135. Id at 714.
136. Id. at 741 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting the Brief for the United States at 7).
137. New York Times, 403 U.S. at 714 (quoting Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70
(1963)).
138. Id. (quoting Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)).
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government failed to meet that burden in this instance.'39
Because six Justices filed separate concurring opinions and three
Justices dissented,"" no clear standard for evaluating wartime censorship
emerged from the Pentagon Papers case. Justices Black and Douglas
both denounced prior restraints in absolute terms. Black wrote, "Both
the history and language of the First Amendment support the view that
the press must be left free to publish news, whatever the source, without
censorship, injunctions, or prior restraints."'' Douglas, in his concur-
ring opinion, said, "[t]he First Amendment provides that 'Congress shall
make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.' That
leaves, in my view, no room for governmental restraint on the press."142
Justices Brennan and Stewart both found room within the First
Amendment for restraints grounded in national security.' 43 In New York
Times, Brennan faulted the government for merely claiming that publica-
tion of the Pentagon Papers "might" compromise the national inter-
est. 'I He demanded a higher degree of certainty: "[O]nly governmental
allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, directly, and im-
mediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the
safety of a transport already at sea can support even the issuance of an
interim restraining order."' 45 Stewart's test also required stronger proof
of an impending breach of security. To allow a prior restraint, a judge
must be able to find "that disclosure ... will surely result in direct, im-
mediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people."
14 6
Brennan, combining his ideas with Stewart's from New York Times,
wrote a concurring opinion in Nebraska Press Assoc. v. Stuart4 ' to form
what may be viewed as the majority opinion of the Pentagon Papers
case.141 With Marshall and Stewart joining, Brennan wrote that the
"military security" exception to the First Amendment's prohibition
against prior restraints was to be construed "very, very narrowly."
139. Id.
140. Id. at 714 (Black, J., concurring), 720 (Douglas, J., concurring), 724 (Brennan, J.,
concurring), 727 (Stewart, J., concurring), 730 (White, J., concurring), 740 (Marshall, J., con-
curring), 748 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), 752 (Harlan, J., dissenting), 759 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
141. Id. at 717 (Black, J., concurring).
142. Id. at 720 (quoting U.S. CONsT. amend I).
143. Id. at 726-27 (Brennan, J., concurring), 727-30 (Stewart, J., concurring).
144. Id. at 725 (Brennan, J., concurring).
145. Id. at 726-27 (Brennan, J., concurring).
146. Id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring).
147. 427 U.S. 539, 572 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring). Nebraska Press involved a suc-
cessful challenge to a Nebraska prosecutor's efforts to restrain press coverage in a highly publi-
cized murder case.
148. Homonoff, supra note 41, at 392.
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Specifically: 14 9
when disclosure "will surely result in direct, immediate, and irrepa-
rable damage to our Nation or its people," .. or when there is
"governmental allegation and proof that publication must inevita-
bly, directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an event kin-
dred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea ....
[But] [i]n no event may mere conclusions be sufficient."
150
With Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall in agreement, and speculating that
Black and Douglas, who would prefer absolute protection, would sup-
port "first amendment protections at least as strong as those in the direct
damage test,"'151 one commentator claimed that "the direct damage test
can be regarded as the majority interpretation of the Pentagon Papers
case.'152
The federal government has satisfied the direct damage test only
once, in a case involving the publication of a magazine article on how to
design a hydrogen bomb.153 In United States v. Progressive, Inc., the
court held that the article, entitled "The H-Bomb Secret: How We Got
It, Why We're Telling It,"' 54 "could possibly provide sufficient informa-
tion to allow a medium size nation to move faster in developing a hydro-
gen weapon."' 55  Citing alternate grounds, the court granted the
government's request for a preliminary injunction preventing publication
of the article. First, the government met its burden of proof under the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to prohibit communication of "restricted
data" that could "injure the United States or... secure an advantage to
any foreign nation." 156 Even in the absence of statutory authorization,
the court would have granted the preliminary injunction "because of the
existence of the likelihood of direct, immediate and irreparable injury to
our nation and its people."'
157
149. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 593.
150. Id at 593 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting New York Times Co. v. United States,
403 U.S. 713, 730 (Stewart, J., concurring), 726-27 (Brennan, J., concurring)).
151. Homonoff, supra note 41, at 392.
152. Id
153. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979), appeal dis-
missed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979).
154. Id at 991.
155. Id at 993.
156. Id. at 994 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2274 (1976)).
157. Id. at 1000 (citing New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971)
(Stewart, J., concurring); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931)). The injunction lasted
seven months. No appellate court heard the First Amendment issue because the government
dropped the case after another publication printed the atomic bomb "secret." Jacobs, supra
note 50, at 702.
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With regard to two specific types of people-military personnel and
intelligence agents-the government may satisfy a lesser standard in or-
der to suppress information that may damage military preparedness or
national security.158 In Priest v. Secretary of the Navy, the Navy court-
martialed a seaman apprentice for publishing newsletters in the spring of
1969 calling on fellow sailors to resist the war in Vietnam.15 9 One news-
letter provided addresses of groups in Canada that aided military desert-
ers."6 These publications violated Article 134 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, which prohibits "all disorders and neglects to the preju-
dice of good order and discipline in the armed forces."1'' Reviewing the
instructions given to the court-martial, the court declared that the proper
standard of review was whether "the publication, under the circum-
stances, tended to interfere with responsiveness to command or to pres-
ent a clear danger to military loyalty, discipline, or morale." 
162
The government may impose restraints on publications written by
CIA agents who have a fiduciary duty to submit for prepublication re-
view any proposed publication about certain agency activities.163 One
such publication was Decent Interval, a book written by Frank W. Snepp
III, a senior analyst for the CIA who was one of the last Americans
evacuated from the American embassy when Saigon fell on April 30,
1975. 6 The book described the final days of the American presence in
Saigon and criticized the CIA's evacuation plan.1 65 As an express condi-
tion of his employment, Snepp had agreed that he would not publish
"any information or material relating to the Agency, its activities or in-
telligence activities generally, either during or after the term of [his] em-
ployment... without specific prior approval by the Agency."'166 Upon
leaving the agency in 1976, Snepp signed another agreement "never" to
reveal "any classified information, or any information concerning intelli-
gence or CIA that has not been made public by CIA... without the
express written consent of the Director of Central Intelligence or his rep-
158. See Priest v. Secretary of the Navy, 570 F.2d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Snepp v. United
States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
159. 570 F.2d at 1014-15.
160. Id. at 1015.
161. 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1988).
162. Priest, 570 F.2d at 1017. See also Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 840 (1976); Parker v.
Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 759 (1974).
163. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 510; United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
164. FRANK SNEPP, DECENT INTERVAL 547-48 (1977).
165. See generally id. See also RONALD ROTUNDA ET. AL., 3 TREATISE ON CONSTTtU-
TIONAL LAW SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 79 n.33 (1986).
166. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 508.
resentative."' 167 The government sued to enforce the agreements.
The Supreme Court imposed a "reasonable means and substantial
ends" standard to evaluate the CIA's rights.1 68 The Court held that the
agreements signed by Snepp were "a reasonable means for protecting"
the government's interest.1 69 Even absent the agreement, "the CIA
could have acted to protect substantial government interests by imposing
reasonable restrictions on employee activities that in other contexts
might be protected by the First Amendment."' 70 The government had a
"compelling interest in protecting both the secrecy of information impor-
tant to our national security and the appearance of confidentiality so es-
sential to the effective operation of our foreign intelligence service."'1
71
The Court denied that Snepp's agreement was a form of censorship.
It said Snepp's contract called for "no more than a clearance procedure
subject to judicial review."' 72 The Court presumed that if Snepp had
submitted his manuscript to the CIA for review and the CIA found that
it contained sensitive material, Snepp and the agency would have worked
together to prevent harmful disclosures.1 73 Without such a cooperative
agreement, the CIA would have had to secure an injunction against pub-
lication.'74 Because of the contract agreements, the Court imposed a
constructive trust on Snepp's profits from the book.1
75
By keeping its analysis within the confines of Snepp's contract agree-
ments, the Court devised a narrow rule. When individuals, such as gov-
ernment employees, receive governmental information to which they
have no constitutional right of access, the government may restrict the
use of such information when:
(1) Those persons in fact agree not to discuss or disclose the
information;
(2) The agreement is a narrow means of promoting governmental
interests unrelated to censorship goals;
(3) The government has a significant interest in [restricting] use of
the information; and
167. Iad at 508 n.1.
168. Id. at 509 n.3.
169. Id. at 509 n.3.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 509 n.3.
172. Id. at 513 n.8.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 516. The Court reached its conclusion despite the government's concession that
the book disclosed no classified information. Id at 511. The Court ruled that the govern-
ment's concession did not "undercutol its claim that Snepp's failure to submit to prepublication
review was a breach of his trust." Id.
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(4) The governmental interest is truly unrelated to the suppression
of information.1
7 6
Because of the many specific factors that must be present for Snepp
to apply, its wording does little to define the boundaries of permissible
prior restraints. A recent article, extrapolating from the federal courts'
prior restraint holdings, proposes an eight-step analysis to evaluate when
a court will most likely uphold a prior restraint. The factors are:
(1) the nation is at or near war or has some extremely vital interest
at stake;
(2) the danger that publication poses is immediate;
(3) the danger is not speculative or conjectural;
(4) the harm that publication would inflict is concrete.... [mean-
ing it] would directly cause casualties or military losses;
(5) a delayed or suppressed report would not significantly harm
the public;
(6) judges cannot evaluate the threat because they lack an under-
standing of the technology involved;
(7) the censorship does not appear to have been imposed to cover
up embarrassing information; and
(8) the prior restraint is narrowly drawn, such that it is aimed
either at one article or a limited class of publications.' 7
As these eight steps indicate, the government faces a steep constitutional
climb when it sets out to restrain communication protected by the First
Amendment.7 8 If a court finds that the government may place a prior
restraint on someone's speech, the restraint must still meet certain proce-
dural safeguards.'
7 9
176. ROTUNDA, supra note 165, at 80.
177. Jacob, supra note 50, at 704 (citations omitted).
178. All speech is protected by the First Amendment except: (1) subversive speech creating
a clear and present danger of imminent lawlessness, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969); (2) fighting words likely to incite physical retaliation, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568 (1942); (3) defamatory speech, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964); (4) obscenity, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); and (5) commercial speech
that is misleading or that concerns unlawful activity, see Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). See also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW § 12-36, at 1048-51 (2d ed. 1988) (tests to determine if speech is protected
include relative certainty of harm, quality of competing interests at stake, and impact of the
restraint as an incidental restraint rather than a gag order).
179. These safeguards include: (1) specifying a brief period of time within which the ad-
ministrator of the prior restraint must act, Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965); (2)
having a statute or an authoritative judicial construction that requires the administrator of the
prior restraint either to allow the speech or go to court to apply the restraint, id.; (3) forbid-
ding ex parte court orders if an adversarial hearing on the question of interim relief is practica-
ble, see Carroll v. President and Commn'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181-83 (1968); (4)
limiting restraints imposed before a final judicial determination on the merits to "preservation
of the status quo for the shortest fixed period compatible with sound judicial resolution,"
Freedman, 380 U.S. at 59; (5) assuring a "prompt final judicial decision" reviewing any "in-
terim and possibly erroneous denial of a license," id.; and (6) if the prior restraint is ordered by
B. The Right of Access for the Press
While the open door to freedom of publication for protected speech
is wide and closes only in the face of imminent national danger, the door
to freedom of access is narrower and only leads to where the general
public may freely go. The Supreme Court has held "that the First
Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special
access to information not available to the public generally."1 0 For ex-
ample, because the general public does not have unlimited access to state
prisons, federal prisons, or military bases, members of the press have no
constitutional right of access to these places. '
The Court has held that the press possesses a right of access similar
to that of the public at large when it finds an historic right of access for
the public and it believes that access serves the policies behind the First
Amendment.1 8 2 In overturning a trial judge's order to exclude all mem-
bers of the press and public from a murder trial, Chief Justice Burger
ruled in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia that the First Amend-
ment guarantees of free speech, free press, and assembly assured the
"right of access to places traditionally open to the public, as criminal
trials long have been.... ." 3 Such access would advance one of the core
purposes behind those guarantees, namely "assuring freedom of commu-
nication on matters relating to the functioning of government."1 84 In
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, Justice Brennan specified how the
right of access to a criminal trial "plays a particularly significant role in
the functioning of the judicial process and the government as a
whole:"' 85
(1) Public scrutiny of the trial protects the integrity of the factfind-
ing process;
a court, requiring the state either to stay the order pending its appeal or provide immediate
appellate review, see National Socialist Party of America v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977) (per
curiam). See generally TRIBE, supra note 177, § 12-39, at 1059-61.
180. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972) (citation omitted).
181. See, eg., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 839 (1976) (upholding Army post regulations
barring political activities on the base, including speeches, demonstrations, and distribution of
literature); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974) (upholding federal regula-
tions barring press interviews with prisoners); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833-34 (1974)
(upholding California prison regulations prohibiting interviews with specific inmates).
182. See, ag., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (upholding the
right to remain in courtroom during testimony of a minor allegedly a victim of sexual offense);
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (upholding the right to attend
murder trials).
183. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 577; see also Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 605
("the criminal trial historically has been open to the press and general public").
184. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575.
185. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606.
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(2) Public access fosters an appearance of fairness and increases
respect for the judicial process; and
(3) Public access "permits the public to participate in and serve as
a check upon the judicial process .... 16
In Sheppard v. Maxwell, 18 7 the Court similarly acknowledged the impor-
tant role that the press plays when it covers a trial: "The press does not
simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscar-
riage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial
processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism."' 88
Like freedom from prior restraint, freedom of access is not absolute,
but the burden of proof is again a heavy one. The standard set forth in
Globe provides: "Where ... the State attempts to deny the right of ac-
cess in order to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information, it must be
shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental inter-
est, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest."' 9 If the purpose
behind the restricted access is not suppression of information, but rather
a limitation of access according to "time, place, and manner," the restric-
tions must serve significant state interests and must leave open adequate
alternative channels of communication. 190
The pools covering such events as White House press conferences
and presidential debates have been found constitutional on "time, place,
and manner" grounds.' 9 ' For example, space limitations required limit-
ing the number of media representatives at certain White House
events.'9 2 The 1984 presidential and vice presidential debates received
pooled TV coverage in the interests of security and space. 193 The federal
186. Id.; see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 275 (1964) (stressing the
importance of "the right of free public discussion of the stewardship of public officials").
187. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
188. Id. at 350.
189. 457 U.S. at 606-07.
190. Id. at 607 n.17 (citing Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63 n.18
(1976)); Schad v. Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 75-76 (1981); see also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536, 554 (1965). But see Jacobs, supra note 50, at 721 ("[The government need only demon-
strate that the access restriction is based on a minimally plausible explanation."). This conclu-
sion that the courts would evaluate access restrictions on a rational basis standard is faulty. It
overlooks the Globe Newspaper case, which establishes strict scrutiny for disclosure-inhibiting
access restrictions and a standard of "significant state interests" and "adequate alternative
channels of communication" for limitations restricting the time, place, and manner of access.
See Globe Newspaper, 452 U.S. at 606-07, 607 n.17.
191. See Cable News Network v. American Broadcasting Co., 518 F. Supp. 1238, 1239-40
(N.D. Ga. 1981) (regarding White House press conferences); WPIX v. League of Women
Voters, 595 F. Supp. 1484, 1485 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (regarding 1984 presidential and vice presi-
dential debates).
192. See Cable News Network, 518 F. Supp. at 1239-40.
193. WPIX v. League of Women Voters, 595 F. Supp. 1484, 1485-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
courts have approved such pools provided that they serve "direct govern-
mental interests." 194 For the Persian Gulf press pools, however, the
courts would not use this intermediate standard of evaluation because
instead of serving time, place, and manner considerations, the pools were
meant to inhibit the disclosure of information.1 95
I. The Constitutionality of the Desert Storm Media
Restrictions
A. Censorship
Applying the standards developed in the Pentagon Papers case and
in Globe, an analysis of the Desert Storm censorship procedures and pool
requirements reveals abridgements of the media's First Amendment
rights. To impose prior restraints on news reports, the government
should be required to prove that disclosure "'will surely result in direct,
immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people,' or...
must inevitably, directly and immediately cause the occurrence of an
event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport at sea."
19 6
The government can more easily justify its censorship procedures at
the beginning of the Persian Gulf War-when the need for surprise was
greatest and the information-gathering capabilities of Iraq were strong-
est-than its use of the same procedures during the later stages of the
conflict. The Allies designed their first air assault to occur on a moonless
night to avoid anti-aircraft fire while pilots knocked out key command
centers. The plan worked almost flawlessly as aircraft jammed Iraqi ra-
dar, missiles destroyed command-and-control centers in Baghdad and
bombers took out Iraqi missile batteries and air defenses. 197 "[T]he
Iraqis... appear to have been taken by surprise, or at least to have been
unprepared for the fury of the assault," one reporter wrote.198 Security
reviews may have helped to prevent the press from divulging information
194. See Cable News Network 518 F. Supp. at 1245 ("The Court is at a loss to find any
direct governmental interest served by this policy" of total exclusion of TV media from lim-
ited-coverage White House events.). For the debates, a private party, not the government,
formed the press pool, but the court approved of it because it helped to solve "feasibility and
security problems." WPIX, 595 F. Supp. at 1490.
195. See infra notes 231-34 and accompanying text.
196. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 593 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(quoting New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 730 (Stewart, J., concurring),
726-27 (Brennan, J., concurring)).
197. Brian Duffy, Desert Storm, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 28, 1991, at 20, 25.
198. George J. Church, So Far, So Good, TIME, Jan. 28, 1991, at 22 [hereinafter Church,
So Far, So Good].
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about the scale of the coalition forces' first strikes.1 99
By the third week of the war, however, the allied coalition had
achieved total air supremacy and had severely weakened Saddam Hus-
sein's forces. 2"° Iraq was no longer equipped to take advantage of any
information it might have learned from the media, thereby ending the
need for censorship. With its air-defense system in ruins, Baghdad aban-
doned attempts at central control: every anti-aircraft and missile battery
was on its own to trace and intercept allied bombers.201 By the last
weeks of fighting, Iraqi troops could not communicate either with Bagh-
dad or with adjoining companies and battalions. They had to fight in
isolation rather than in coordination. 202 With the enemy in such disar-
ray, it is unlikely that a court would be convinced that the militarily
unsupervised release of information through the media would have
risked immediate damage to American troops.20 3
The weakness of the Iraqi army was not the only reason why uncen-
sored reports did not pose an immediate danger to national security. Un-
censored reports also contained information from allied authorities that
was intentionally inaccurate. A report early in the war that sixty Iraqi
tanks had defected was a ruse planted by the CIA to try to lure real
defectors.2" In the days leading to the ground offensive, military escorts
frequently took correspondents to observe troops near the Kuwaiti bor-
der so that reports from there would distract Iraqis from the buildup of
troops to the west.205 Similarly, U.S. Marines conspicuously rehearsed
amphibious landings that were reported by the press and deceived Iraq
into preparing for an assault on the Kuwaiti coast that never came.
20 6
"[T]he press coverage, as General Norman Schwarzkopf pointedly ob-
199. According to one author, to preserve surprise the Department of Defense could more
easily justify prohibiting live television broadcasts from areas under fire than censoring printed
reports, which lack live television's immediacy. Jacobs, supra note 50, at 709.
200. George J. Church, A Long Siege Ahead, TIME, Feb. 4, 1991, at 20 [hereinafter
Church, A Long Siege Ahead].
201. George J. Church, Combat in the Sand, TIME, Feb. 11, 1991, at 21-22 [hereinafter
Church, Combat in the Sand].
202. George J. Church, The 100 Hours, TIME, Mar. 11, 1991, at 22, 25 [hereinafter
Church, The 100 Hours].
203. If any information did pose a security risk, the plaintiffs in the Nation Magazine case
were confident that the past policy of the Department of Defense to provide "directions to the
press as to what they should not reveal" was sufficient to keep such information from the
enemy. First Amended Verified Complaint at 12, Nation Magazine v. United States Dep't of
Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (No. 91 Civ. 0238 (LBS)).
204. Zoglin, supra note 85, at 56.
205. Id.
206. Church, The 100 Hours, supra note 202, at 25.
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served, was a big help."2 "7
The government's planting of disinformation has greater implica-
tions than rendering security reviews unnecessary. False leads and ma-
nipulation by the military made some members of the media feel duped
at the hands of the government and distrusted in the eyes of the public.
20 8
The estranged relationship between the media and the military, simmer-
ing since the Vietnam War, grew more heated with the imposition of
press pools, the censorship of stories, and the presentation to the press of
staged military operations designed to deceive the enemy. 209 By trying to
dig beyond the allies' official line of information during a popular war,
the press darkened its public image. "There is probably greater public
anger with the press than at any time since the end of the war in Viet-
nam," according to First Amendment attorney Floyd Abrams.21 ° Some
journalists are afraid that the military's public relations victory "may
serve as a model for wars to come.
211
B. Pooling Procedures
1. The Right of Access to War
Members of the media have a strong argument that any future limi-
tations placed on their access to war modeled after the Desert Storm
procedures will be unconstitutional. First, although the Supreme Court
has not expressly ruled that the public, and therefore the press, has a
right of access to war zones, the press historically has had access to mili-
tary operations in covering all the major conflicts of the past 130
years. 212 Admittedly, this history of access cannot compare to the centu-
ries-long public access to Anglo-Saxon trials, which Chief Justice Burger
207. Zoglin, supra note 85, at 56. Because of the absence of immediate danger, the govern-
ment failed to meet its "heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of [the pre-
publication reviews]." See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971)
(quoting Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)). Assuming,
however, that the burden to justify prior restraints had been met, the government prepublica-
tion reviews would still have had to meet certain procedural safeguards. See supra note 179;
see also Jacobs, supra note 50, at 708-11.
As applied to the Desert Storm prepublication reviews, these procedural safeguards were
met because in case of disputes between security officers and reporters, the disputed material
was sent "immediately" to the Joint Information Bureau Director and then, if necessary, "im-
mediately" to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs for review, with the ulti-
mate decision to publish made by the reporters' news organization. App. C, supra note 89, at
1577-78; see supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
208. See Zoglin, supra note 85, at 56-57.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 57.
211. Id.
212. Homonoff, supra note 41, at 398.
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traced back before the Norman Conquest.2 13 Allowing for the relative
youth of the American press, one may see the news coverage of
America's wars as steady. Reporters passed easily from one side to the
other during the Civil War,214 accompanied the first U.S. troops to Eu-
rope in 1917,215 and joined the invasion forces of Normandy in 1944216
and of Cambodia in 1970.217
Second, the media's reports on military operations, like reports on
criminal trials, advance the policy of the First Amendment to place pub-
lic debate in the forefront of a democratic society.21 First-hand news
accounts make military commanders directly accountable to the public
for their decisions, and the public is able to make its own judgments
about the actions of such leaders.219 Similarly, news reports open the
decisions of the federal government to scrutiny and enable the public to
engage in a well-informed discussion of governmental affairs. For exam-
ple, the plaintiffs in Nation Magazine noted, "[T]he question whether or
when a ground operation should be undertaken, is a subject of national
213. See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 565 (1980).
214. Drew Middleton, Barring Reporters from the Battlefield, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1984,
§ 6 (Magazine) at 36, 37.
215. John Hohenberg, FOREIGN CORRESPONDENCE: THE GREAT REPORTERS & THEIR
TIMES 236 (1964).
216. Cross and Griffin, supra note 1, at 998.
217. Homonoff, supra note 41, at 382. See infra text accompanying notes 351-55.
218. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 603.04 (1982); Richmond
Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575.
Some differences should be noted, however, between courtrooms and battlefields. Judges
have imposed access restrictions in their courtrooms often to ensure a defendant's right to a
fair trial under the Sixth Amendment. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 560-61. In
Globe, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts imposed an access limitation "to en-
courage young victims of sexual offenses to come forward ... [and] to preserve their ability to
testify by protecting them from undue psychological harm at trial." 457 U.S. at 600 (quoting
Globe Newspaper v. Superior Court, 401 N.E.2d 360, 369 (Mass. 1980)).
Rather than grounding itself on a constitutional right, the policy to exclude the press from
military operations has instead invoked the interests of national security. The U.S. military
leaders in Grenada banned press coverage to ensure surprise, to prevent obstruction by the
press, and to avoid the need to protect reporters. Pincus, supra note 51, at 813; Cross &
Griffin, supra note 1, at 1005. The Desert Storm pool restrictions strove to "maintain opera-
tional security, protect the safety of the troops, and prevent interference with military opera-
tions." App. D, supra note 6, at 1578.
The potential hazards presented by the press during a trial differ drastically from the
dangers that may occur during a war. If a defendant does not receive a fair trial because the
presence of the media has tainted the proceedings, the defendant may appeal and secure a
reversal and directions for a new trial. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966). If the
interference of the press causes a breach of security during war, no appeals process may undo
the deaths or other losses that may result.
219. Homonoff, supra note 41, at 399. See also supra notes 184-88 and accompanying text.
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debate.122 0 As Justice Black wrote in his concurring opinion in the Pen-
tagon Papers case, "[P]aramount among the responsibilities of a free
press is the duty to prevent any part of the government from deceiving
the people and sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers
and foreign shot and shell., 2 21 Seeing a similar role for the press in war-
time, the Nation Magazine court leaned toward finding the Desert Storm
battlefield access limitations to be unconstitutional: "[T]here is support
for the proposition that the press has at least some minimal right of ac-
cess to view and report about major events that affect the functioning of
government, including.., an overt combat operation.
222
Despite the goals of the First Amendment, it is arguable that the
press may be excluded from covering military operations. 223 This argu-
ment is based on the Supreme Court's holding that military sites are not
public forums.224 In addition, the Secretary of State may deny tourist
visas for travel to countries with which the United States has broken
diplomatic ties, such as Cuba.2 2 5 Because members of the press have no
greater right to access than the rest of the public, 226 one could conclude
that the government may keep the media from battlefields.2 27 This argu-
ment, however, overlooks an important provision in the now-moot visa
restrictions upheld by the Supreme Court.2 28  The Secretary of State
could make an exception to the visa restrictions for "persons whose
travel may be regarded as being in the best interests of the United States,
such as newsmen. '229 In addition, the State Department allowed jour-
nalists to travel to Ethiopia during that country's war with Italy in 1935
and to Spain during the Spanish Civil War in 1936, areas to which citi-
220. First Amended Verified Complaint at 27, Nation Magazine v. United States Dep't of
Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (No. 91 Civ. 0238 (LBS)).
221. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (Black, J., concurring).
222. Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1572.
223. See James David Kleeger, The First Amendment, the Press, and the U.S. Invasion of
Grenada: Balancing the Constitutional Interests, 12 W. ST. U. L. REV. 217, 227-28 (1984).
224. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976). For the Supreme Court's three-tiered analysis of
public forums and the restriction of speech therein, see supra note 109.
225. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965).
226. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684-85 (1972).
227. Kleeger, supra note 223, at 227-28.
228. The restrictions are moot because the Secretary of State may no longer deny passports
to travel to particular geographic areas during peacetime. 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1989).
A recent article explains that one way that the government may still restrain international
travel, for example, is to prohibit people subject to the jurisdiction of the United States from
paying Cuba or a Cuban national for any service connected with travel to Cuba. Jacobs, supra
note 50, at 714 n.240 (citing C.F.R. § 515.561 (j) (1991)).
229. Zemel, 381 U.S. at 3.
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zens could not generally receive passports during those times.230
2. A View From the Globe: Strict Scrutiny and Narrow Tailoring
Assuming that a constitutional right of access to war zones for the
press exists, the purposes behind the formation of the Persian Gulf press
pools should determine the level of scrutiny a court would apply to them.
Although one of the stated purposes of the Media Ground Rules was to
"protect the security and the safety of the service members," the Defense
Department official in charge of the ground rules admitted that they were
designed "to discourage information that would jeopardize military oper-
ations. '231  If the Desert Storm pools were formed primarily for a disclo-
sure-inhibiting purpose, they contrast with the pools covering such
events as White House press conferences and presidential debates, which
have been organized to accommodate such "time, place, and manner"
concerns as space limitations and security.2 32 The Supreme Court re-
quires such pools to serve "direct governmental interests. 2 33 Because
they arguably were designed more to inhibit the dissemination of infor-
mation than to accommodate time, place, and manner constraints, the
Persian Gulf pools must withstand strict scrutiny to be constitutional.234
Under a strict scrutiny analysis, the government must prove that
denial of access is necessitated by "a compelling governmental interest,
and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. ' 235  Given the federal
230. Id at 9. When the government has specifically denied a reporter a passport to a
sensitive part of the world, the courts have supported those decisions. See Worthy v. Herter,
270 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (denying a journalist passport renewal when he would not agree
to refrain from travelling to five areas, including communist territories of China, Vietnam, and
Korea), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 918 (1959).
231. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
232. See WPIX v. League of Women Voters, 595 F. Supp. 1484, 1494 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(dictating use of pooled TV coverage for 1984 presidential and vice presidential debates be-
cause of security and space interests); Cable News Network v. American Broadcasting Co.,
518 F. Supp. 1238, 1239-40 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (limiting number of media representatives at
White House events required by space limitations).
233. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
234. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 452 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1982). Considering
the discriminatory application of the press pool rules, the Nation Magazine court analyzed the
pooling procedures under the time, place, and manner standard. Nation Magazine v. United
States Dep't of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1574 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
One author, applying the governmental interests of surprise and logistics, concludes that
the access restrictions are constitutional. Jacobs, supra note 50, at 721-23. This conclusion
results from an initial assumption that access restrictions must pass only a rational basis test.
Id. at 721. In light of Globe Newspaper, which the author does not consider in his analysis, the
Desert Storm restrictions must at least conform to the standards for time, place, and manner
restrictions, namely, serving significant state interests and leaving open adequate alternative
channels of communication. See Globe Newspaper, 452 U.S. at 607 n.17.
235. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606-07.
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courts' reluctance to adjudicate political questions involving Executive
decisions regarding foreign affairs, defense policy, and the military,2 36 a
court could find that the government's perceived need "to maintain oper-
ational security, protect the safety of troops, and prevent interference
with military operations" '237 through media pools during the Persian
Gulf War was a sufficiently compelling interest. For instance, when mili-
tary officials imposed a curfew on all Japanese Americans on the West
Coast as part of an anti-espionage and anti-sabotage program during
World War II, the Supreme Court held:
Since the Constitution commits to the Executive and to the Con-
gress the exercise of the war power in all the vicissitudes and con-
ditions of warfare, it has necessarily given them wide scope for the
exercise of judgment and discretion in determining the nature and
extent of the threatened injury or danger and in the selecting of the
means for resisting it.
238
Similarly, the federal courts relied on the political question doctrine
to thwart challenges against the legality of the war in Vietnam. 239 In
Atlee v. Laird, seven plaintiffs in a class action asked that a three-judge
panel be convened to determine the constitutionality of the Vietnam
236. See, e.g., Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 90 (1953) (declining to interfere with
commissioning of Army officers, which is a matter of discretion within province of the Presi-
dent); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (upholding congres-
sional resolution that if the President found that prohibition of selling arms to countries
fighting in the Chaco, an area between Argentina, Bolivia, and Paraguay, would help re-estab-
lish peace there, it would be a crime to sell such weapons); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996
(1979) (granting certiorari, vacating judgment, and remanding case with directions to dismiss
complaint against President Carter for terminating treaty of defense of Government of Tai-
wan).
Echoing the Curtiss- Wright Court's emphasis on foreign versus internal affairs, Justice
Rehnquist wrote in his Goldwater concurrence, "I think that the justifications for concluding
that the question here is political in nature are... compelling... because it involves foreign
relations--specifically a treaty commitment to use military force in the defense of a foreign
government if attacked." 444 U.S. at 1003-04.
237. App. D, supra note 6, at 1578.
238. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 93.
Hirabayashi and a related case based on the same internment program imposed by the
military, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), may be of questionable precedential
value today because of recent legislation passed by Congress. In the Civil Liberties Act of
1988, Congress acknowledged "the fundamental injustice of the evacuation, relocation and
internment" of Japanese Americans on the West Coast during World War II. 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 1989(1) (1988). Congress apologized "on behalf of the people of the United States," and it
pledged "to discourage the occurrence of similar injustices and violations of civil liberties in
the future." Id §§ 1989(2), (6). Each eligible individual received $20,000 as compensation.
Id. § 1989b-4(l).
239. See Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689, 707 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (three-judge panel), af'd
sub nor., Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973) (holding that the legality of Vietnam War
nonjusticiable); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
936 (1974) (holding that the legality of Cambodian bombing nonjusticiable).
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War. The complaint alleged that American participation in the war and
the expenditure of funds for it violated the Constitution, and that the
conduct of the war violated treaties signed by the United States.2' After
tracing the development of the political question doctrine,241 the court
declared,
It is clear that weighty arguments can be mustered to support
either side of the merits of the question whether the President has
the authority to maintain American forces in Southeast Asia. This
is so because modem technology has so altered global relationships
of good faith that our military presence in Vietnam is necessary to
protect the security interests of the United States. Under these cir-
cumstances-when plausible arguments tend to support either of
two sides of the merits of a question concerning the foreign affairs
field-a court should refrain from determining whether the Presi-
dent in making war has properly done so under the power commit-
ted to him by the Constitution.242
The Nation Magazine court, however, found "unpersuasive... [the] ar-
gument that the political question doctrine bars an Article III court from
adjudicating any claims that involve the United States military."243 The
court envisioned the judicial power to invalidate regulations that either
explicitly made admission to a war-time press pool dependent on the
political content of a correspondent's prior work or that made admission
contingent on racial or religious grounds.2 "
Even if a court were to find a governmental interest in the Desert
Storm access restrictions compelling enough to meet the first prong of
the Globe standard, the pooling arrangements would not satisfy Globe's
second prong. Confining all media representatives to escorted pools was
not a narrowly tailored means of protecting national security. Granting
the press entry to the battlefields or the bombing sites of their choice
need not have jeopardized surprise. For example, during the war be-
tween Britain and Argentina in the Falkland Islands, the British Navy
kept the press confined to ships until the operations began.24 The mili-
tary then permitted the press to go ashore with the landing teams,
thereby preserving secrecy, security, and access to the press.
24 6
During Desert Storm the timing of the first attacks was no real sur-
prise and the military could have preserved security by enforcing the
240. 347 F. Supp. at 691.
241. Id. at 693-700.
242. Id. at 706-07.
243. Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1568.
244. Id.
245. Homonoff, supra note 41, at 401.
246. See Homonoff, supra note 41, at 401.
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night operations guidelines already in place. In November 1990, when
the United Nations proclaimed that Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait by
January 15, 1991, "the deadline for combat [was] set six weeks in ad-
vance and [was] publicized more intensively than any other in his-
tory.... [T]he attack proceed[ed] in precisely the fashion that had all but
officially been proclaimed in advance, with massive air attacks."'24 7 The
U.S. military could have allowed media correspondents to be present
during these and most other operations as long as they respected the
safety precautions in the guidelines. One such precaution aimed to pro-
tect high-tech nighttime maneuvers: "The only approved light source is
a flashlight with a red lens. No visible light source, including flash or
television lights, will be used when operating with forces at night unless
specifically approved by the on-scene commander."248
As the war progressed and Saddam Hussein's forces were depleted,
strict pool requirements were no longer necessary to protect American
troops. 249 As a result, the pooling procedures became increasingly less
narrowly tailored. The Pentagon recognized the decreased need to sup-
press media access and expanded the number of correspondents allowed
in combat pools from 99 to 200 during the ground campaign.250
A specific component of the press pool requirements-restricted
travel-also was not narrowly tailored. One of the justifications for hav-
ing media members remain with a military escort and follow the escort's
instructions was to "facilitate troop movement. '25 1 Such travel restric-
tions would make sense if confined to situations of military necessity,
such as correspondents covering "commando" units that operated at
night to make quick seizures of discrete targets.252 The Nation Magazine
court agreed with this rationale for limited restrictions on the press, stat-
ing that the court "would have neither the power nor the inclination to
review a military determination that the presence of a large cadre of press
representatives at a particular time and place would jeopardize the covert
nature of a military operation., 25 3 The court recognized the need "for
some selection process when either logistics or security concerns may
247. Church, So Far, So Good, supra note 198, at 18.
248. App. C, supra note 90, at 1577.
249. See supra notes 200-03 and accompanying text. See also Pincus, supra note 51, at 845-
47 (arguing that the need to deny press access to Grenada to ensure secrecy and surprise
abated after the first day of the operation).
250. Zoglin, supra note 85, at 57.
251. CCP Ground Rules, supra note 10, at 1, § 1.A.
252. See Pincus, supra note 51, at 848 (In Grenada, the U.S. government had a significant
interest in avoiding the potentially distracting presence of the press while troops seized the
airport, the governor's mansion, and a medical school campus.).
253. Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1567.
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mandate limitation on the number of journalists who may be present." '254
Such a limitation would be a constitutional time, place, and manner
restriction.
Some commentators suggest that "narrowly tailored" censorship
may be more benign than broad restrictions on press access. 2 55 They
contend that because the government's main concern is the release of
sensitive information and not the presence of reporters, courts should
look more favorably on prior restraints on war reports than on denial of
access to battlefields.256 In other words, a "press with access and censor-
ship is superior to a press with no access when it comes to informing the
public."
257
3. Shared Media Reports: Illegal "Community Pool"?
In addition to security reviews and access restrictions, the Desert
Storm pooling procedures also subjected members of the media to invol-
untary sharing. Forcing the media to pool their reports and pictures is
arguably a governmental taking under the Fifth Amendment. The Fifth
Amendment states, "No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation." '258 To determine if a govern-
ment action is a taking that requires compensation, courts will conduct a
"substantially related means, legitimate ends" analysis and an economic
evaluation.259 For example, a land-use regulation does not constitute a
taking "if it 'substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests' and does
not 'den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land.' ,,21
Despite appearances, the government's treatment of news reports
during the hostilities in the Persian Gulf did not amount to a taking. The
media reports, photos, and videotape did not go toward a public use, but
rather to other private parties. The pool participants distributed their
work among pool-eligible representatives of their medium, albeit at the
direction of the government as a condition for pool membership.26 1 But
the government's regulations did not require pool members to make their
reports available to non-pool members.262
254. Id. at 1574.
255. Cross & Griffin, supra note 1, at 1042; Homonoff, supra note 41, at 401.
256. Homonoff, supra note 41, at 401.
257. Cross & Griffin, supra note 1, at 1042.
258. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
259. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987).
260. Id. (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
261. App. D, supra note 6, at 1579.
262. See id.; Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1564.
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Assuming that the reports did go to public use, the members of the
media still retained an economically viable use of their work even after
distributing it to their competitors. Although such distribution elimi-
nated the value that a report may have had as an "exclusive," the report
could still be published or broadcast by its originator. The economic loss
to a newspaper or a television network caused by the elimination of the
exclusivity of its news reports is difficult to measure. "There was a na-
tional craving for news" during the war,26 and the three major television
networks pumped out forty-two continuous hours of coverage after the
first air raids. 2 The networks each spent an estimated $1.5 million a
week covering the war, in part to expand their evening half-hour news
programs to one hour.265
Under the second part of the takings analysis, the government stated
its purposes for the pooling procedures so broadly and the shared-work
requirement was so integrally bound with those procedures, a court
could find that the pooling procedures-including the directive to share
news reports- substantially advanced legitimate state interests. The De-
partment of Defense claimed that it formed the media pools as a compro-
mise between the media's wish to have all interested correspondents
cover the war and the military's responsibility to maintain national se-
curity.266 Unimpeded and safeguarded military operations are no doubt
legitimate state interests. Does forcing the media to share its work ad-
vance those interests? By itself, no. But limiting the number of media
members throughout the Persian Gulf theater substantially advanced the
government's goals. The government would argue that the fewer report-
ers in the field, the fewer outsiders observed operations and the greater
security there was.267 Once the government reduced the number of re-
porters who could roam the battlefields, it made its plan more palatable
to the press by arranging, through shared reports, that no news team
would have the unfair advantage of exclusive coverage. The press went
along with the idea, distributing its work to fellow pool members and
submitting to the other media constraints in order to get its share of first-
hand accounts of the action. A New York Times reporter wrote, "[T]he
few who gain[ed] places in the pool ... count[ed] themselves lucky" and
considered the military's restrictions the "price for seeing the war."
268
263. Nancy Gibbs, A First Thick Shock of War, TIME, Jan. 28, 1991, at 34, 37.
264. Richard Zoglin, Live From the Middle East!, TIME, Jan. 28, 1991, at 69, 70.
265. Id. at 70; Alter, supra note 104, at 61.
266. App. D, supra note 6, at 1578. See also note 121 and accompanying text.
267. See Zoglin, supra note 3, at 44-45.
268. Browne, supra note 78, at 29.
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Historically, the backdrop of war has made it more difficult to estab-
lish a governmental taking. In United States v. Central Eureka Mining
Co.,269 the plaintiffs challenged an order passed by the War Production
Board in 1942 that mandated nonessential gold mines to close down in
order to attract gold miners to nonferrous mines that were producing
materials depleted by the war.270 The Court first recognized that under
traditional analysis, governmental regulation "can so diminish the value
of property as to constitute a taking."' 27 ' In the context of war, however,
the Court noted:
we have been reluctant to find that degree of regulation which,
without saying so, requires compensation to be paid for resulting
losses of income. [Citations omitted.] The reasons are plain. War,
particularly in modern times, demands the strict regulation of
nearly all resources. It makes demands which otherwise would be
insufferable. But wartime economic restrictions, temporary in
character, are insignificant when compared to the widespread un-
compensated loss of life and freedom of action which war tradi-
tionally demands.272
Although the gold mining restrictions during World War II provide an
inexact analogy to the pooling regulations during Desert Storm, Central
Eureka indicates how a court would probably evaluate a takings chal-
lenge to the Desert Storm pooling procedures. Balancing the value of
news footage and interviews against the potential loss of soldiers' lives or
compromised military action, a court would probably find the scales of
justice, centered on a takings analysis, tipped toward national security.273
IV. Conclusion
National security does not so easily tip the scales of justice against
the First Amendment. The prerequisites for prior restraints and re-
269. 357 U.S. 155 (1958).
270. Id. at 156, 157.
271. Id. at 168.
272. Id. at 168.
273. At most, the sharing of the media's reports may have violated procedural due process.
Under a procedural due process analysis, a court would determine the type of procedures
necessary to pool the media's work by balancing the importance of the private interest affected
by the official action; the risk of erroneously depriving such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value of additional procedural safeguards; and the government's inter-
ests, including fiscal and administrative efficiency. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976).
The press certainly has an interest in maintaining control of its work, but the members of
each medium determined the procedures for sharing once they agreed to participate in the
military news pools. App. D, supra note 6, at 1579. These procedures facilitated the govern-
ment's interest in a nonobstructive press corps that cooperated with military directives. There-
fore, under the Mathews test, the media pool procedures appear constitutional.
stricted access are stringent. Security reviews and access restrictions dur-
ing Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm flouted one of
the primary goals of the First Amendment: an informed public citizenry
that may intelligently discuss the workings of government.2 7 4 When a
government decides to commit its troops to war, the significance of the
press as a source of information intensifies. The journalists' reports allow
"the folks back home" to know how events are progressing "over there."
Attempts to stifle what the press can say or to conceal what the press can
see require the strict scrutiny of the courts. The Department of Defense
escaped such an examination when the court evaluating the Desert Storm
media procedures dismissed the case.
2 71
If the court in Nation Magazine had reached the merits of the case,
it would have been forced to confront the constitutional deficiencies of
the media ground rules and guidelines used during the war in the Persian
Gulf. Applying the national security exception for prior restraints devel-
oped by Justices Brennan and Stewart in New York Times Co. v. United
States, it is difficult to see the "inevitabl[e], directfl, and immediatefl"
danger or the "direct, immediate, and irreparable damage"2 76 that the
troops or the nation as a whole would have faced if the press had been
free to decide what information about the war to report.27 7 Voluntary
ground rules-consisting of a list of types of information that should not
be released-worked in Vietnam against a more formidable opponent,
and the press admits that during wartime, it is willing to adhere to such
rules again.278
Subjecting the government's justifications for using press pools to
the Globe Newspaper test, the government's "compelling interest ' 279 in
maintaining the security and secrecy of military operations was credible,
at least during the opening stages of the war. The extensive travel re-
strictions and the need for escorts throughout the Persian Gulf theater
were not, however, "narrowly tailored."
While trying to extricate Saddam Hussein's dictatorial regime from
Kuwait, the U.S. military could have best demonstrated democracy in
action by allowing the press both to fend for itself and to decide for itself
274. See, eg., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980).
275. Nation Magazine v. United States Dep't of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1575
(S.D.N.Y. 1991); see supra notes 10-40 and accompanying text.
276. See 403 U.S. 713, 730 (Stewart, J., concurring) (1971).
277. See id. at 726-27 (Brennan, J., concurring).
278. Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1564 n.4 ("[I]t is a version of the ground rules as
presently written that were utilized during the Vietnam conflict, which the plaintiffs suggest
should be the only restriction on the press in war time.") See supra note 70.
279. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1982).
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what information would harm national security. Even in Vietnam,
where the press was notably critical of the military,2" one colonel ex-
plained why he allowed the media to follow his troops: "We are an
Army of free men, defending a nation of free men and women who have
the right to know what we are doing in their names."
28'
280. See Malcolm W. Browne, Conflicting Censorship Upsets Many Journalist, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 21, 1991, at AlO ("The system implemented [in the Persian Gulf] has its roots in
military dissatisfaction with news coverage of the Vietnam War, which some military officials
continue to argue was lost by the news media.").
281. Galloway, supra note 4, at 49.
